The South Atlantic region, a stretch between South America’s eastern shores and West Africa, often sits in the shadows of broader strategic debates. Yet it is rapidly becoming a pivotal corridor linking Europe and the Indo-Pacific through routes like the Panama Canal and the Cape of Good Hope. Disruptions in the Red Sea in early 2024 helped push vessel tonnage through the Cape up by about 60%.
This basin hosts influential players such as Argentina, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa. It also sits atop valuable mineral resources—cobalt, lithium, copper, and silver—that are crucial for the green transition and for defense. As seabed interests and Antarctic frontiers emerge, competition in the South Atlantic could intensify.
The region is also a major route for drug trafficking into Europe, with the main cocaine corridor moving from Andean countries toward Europe, often via West or Central Africa. From 2019 to 2024, authorities seized more than 550 tonnes of cocaine destined for EU ports in South American territory.
Coastlines along the South Atlantic are seeing stronger security, diplomatic, and trade linkages. Angola, Brazil, Nigeria, and South Africa are central to this, while other states on both shores are pursuing broader cooperation, including dialogues among regional organizations.
Even though regional defense spending remains relatively modest—Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa together accounted for just over 3% of global defense outlays in 2024—governments on both sides acknowledge the basin’s significance for countering transregional threats such as drug trafficking, piracy, and external military influence. The security architecture here is comparatively thin. Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization never came to fruition; instead, the South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone (ZOPACAS) has served as the main framework since its inception in 1986, aiming to foster peace, cooperation, and nuclear non-proliferation in the region, while keeping foreign nuclear powers at bay. Since 2016, Brazil has woven ZOPACAS into its national and naval strategies to counter external interference and organized crime, especially in the Gulf of Guinea.
Maritime security collaboration continues to grow. Notable efforts include the India–Brazil–South Africa (IBSAMAR) naval exercises in October 2024 and the GoG Operation GUINEX V in April 2025. Brazil and several African nations joined the US-led Obangame Express and the French-led Nemo exercises in 2025. Brazil backs the Yaoundé Architecture for maritime security and participates as an observer in the G7++ Friends of the GoG. It also cooperates closely with Benin, Nigeria, and Senegal through joint anti-piracy drills and ship-board inspections. A key political signal occurred on 25 August 2025, when Brazilian President Lula pledged to appoint a Federal Police attaché to Abuja during Nigerian President Tinubu’s visit, underscoring the deepening security partnership.
As trade and supply chains face weaponization and shifts in global commerce, countries around the South Atlantic are diversifying partnerships. From 2018 to 2024, trade between Latin America and Africa’s Atlantic coast expanded notably: Argentina up 13%, Brazil up 53%, and Colombia up 139%. Formal regional trade frameworks remain limited—MERCOSUR–SACU is the only existing treaty—though numerous bilateral memoranda of understanding have proliferated. South Africa has signed deals with Brazil and Argentina spanning education, sports, agriculture, customs, taxation, and investment. In August 2025, Brazil and Nigeria finalized MoUs covering trade, energy, aviation, science, and finance. Petrobras resumed operations in São Tomé and Príncipe and signaled plans to re-enter Nigeria for hydrocarbon development.
A shared ambition to deepen cooperation and reform multilateral systems is driving Africa–Latin America engagement. High-level exchanges in 2025 among the African Union, CARICOM, and CELAC highlighted growing cooperation on culture, trade, visas, and reparatory justice. Brazil and South Africa have been central to strengthening Africa–South America ties, leveraging their roles as hosts of the 2024 and 2025 G20 summits to showcase this cross-Atlantic partnership. Yet relations with the US in 2025 have been tense for both countries, with accusations from Washington about free-speech suppression in Brazil and alleged genocide in South Africa. This friction has nudged Brazil and Africa closer together and elevated their leadership in the Global South. Lula’s presidency has reinvigorated Africa–Brazil relations, including visits to Angola, Egypt, and Nigeria since 2023–2025, and reciprocal visits by African leaders. He reopened embassies closed under prior administrations, hosted key Africa–Brazil forums, and advanced food security dialogues with Africa.
Beyond Brazil, other nations have expanded their Atlantic links. Colombia rolled out an Africa strategy for 2022–2026. Venezuela-led ALBA, together with Cuba and Nicaragua, signed an MoU with SADC. The Benguela Current Commission, embraced by South Africa, Namibia, and Angola, reinforces a cooperative approach to marine ecosystems, while Morocco launched the Atlantic African States process in 2022. Not all hemispheric players are tilting toward the South Atlantic, though; Argentina has scaled back its African outreach and even reconsidered BRICS membership, while President Milei has shown openness to northern Atlantic defense cooperation, including authorizing US access to Ushuaia and seeking NATO partnership.
The South Atlantic is drawing more global actors. In November 2025, Togo and Russia signed a military cooperation agreement granting Moscow access to the Gulf of Guinea. China has been particularly active, pursuing diplomacy, infrastructure, resources, and security partnerships. Trade with coastal South Atlantic countries reached €410 billion in 2024, up 74% with South America and 59% with Africa since 2019. China is seeking long-term access to critical minerals like lithium and expanding energy-capacity through the Belt and Road Initiative. Chinese tech firms dominate regional digital markets, and Beijing’s security footprint is growing—with arms trade and military diplomacy increasing across the Americas and Africa. Chinese port investments, including Walvis Bay in Namibia, could enable a broader strategic footprint.
The United States is reevaluating its posture in the South Atlantic, reflecting more than €200 billion in trade and around USD 114 million in direct investment in 2024. The Partnership for Atlantic Cooperation (PAC), launched in 2023, faces a uncertain path under a potential second Trump term amid skepticism toward multilateralism and tensions with South Africa and Brazil. Washington has leaned toward tariffs, assertive actions in the Caribbean, and threats of action in Nigeria, while deepening ties with ideologically aligned governments like Argentina and forging major deals with West and Central Africa from the US-Africa business summit in Angola.
Beyond the trio of major powers, an expanding set of players—Canada, France, Portugal, Spain, Germany, Italy, and Morocco—are treating the Southern Atlantic as a strategic theater. In August 2025, the United Arab Emirates signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership with Angola, committing about USD 6.5 billion in investments.
Institutional leadership and investment from the European Union (EU) remain strong in the South Atlantic. The EU is the region’s largest investor between 2023 and 2024, surpassing USD 245 million in sector funding (over twice the US and far more than China). The EU also contributes to maritime security through programs like SEACOP VI, which fights illicit maritime activity across Africa and Latin America, acknowledging the interconnected nature of maritime theaters.
As the South Atlantic realigns, the EU must adopt a more strategic and proactive approach. With deeper cross-Atlantic cooperation, the EU can safeguard its interests amid rising great-power competition. This means supporting infrastructure, advancing green and digital transitions, and strengthening economic ties, including advancing the EU–MERCOSUR framework and deeper engagement with African partners to reduce supply-chain vulnerabilities. Expanding security initiatives—such as capacity-building and maritime-domain awareness—alongside partners on both shores can help address threats common to both the North and South Atlantic.
Engagement with this evolving transatlantic landscape is essential to protect EU interests in a world of increasing geopolitical competition among major powers.
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